Self-Consciousness and Practical Reason in Fichte's First Theorem of Natural Right

Fergus Horan

October 7, 2026

Abstract

This paper reconstructs Fichte's argument for the primacy of practical reason in his 1796 *Foundations of Natural Right*. The conclusion is won by arguing that the distinctive character of finite self-conscious thought would not be possible unless the I were the kind of entity that set ends for itself. Fichte's argument is brief, and his definition of finite self-conscious thought and argument for why only setting ends satisfies this definition have not been well understood by commentators. On my reconstruction, Fichte claims that finite self-conscious thought must be limited, in that its representations are beholden to the world for their success, and self-reverting, in that the entity in the world that makes those representations successful is the I itself. Setting ends uniquely satisfies these criteria, insofar as an end is beholden to an action in the world for its success, and the entity that completes that action is the I who sets the end.

Introduction

Fichte's First Theorem in the *Foundations of Natural Right in Accordance with the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre* concludes with the following striking assertion:

> What is being claimed is that the practical I is the I of original self-consciousness; that a rational being perceives itself immediately only in willing, and would not perceive itself and thus would also not perceive the world (and therefore would not even be an intelligence), if it were not a practical being. [*FNR* 20][1]

The idea expressed in this complex, multi-clause, jargon-heavy sentence is on the face of it bizarre. Fichte claims that if we were not beings that are endowed with wills, or the capacity for free action, we would not be self-conscious, we would not be capable of perception, and we would not be capable of cognition. The claim that willing is constitutive of self-consciousness is a strange, and on the face of it implausible, assertion.

[1] Translations of Fichte's works are given with the following abbreviations, with page numbers referring to the German edition given by the respective translators: *FNR*:[Fichte, 2000], *WLnm*: [Fichte, 1998], *SE*: [Fichte, 2005].

Why is willing fundamentally more self-conscious than perceiving the world or intellectual comprehension, given they can all be read as a kind of self-ascription? Why would the "I" in "*I* intend to write the letter" be more fundamental than "*I* am seeing the letter before me" or "*I* know it is a letter before me"?

This paper reconstructs Fichte's argument for the claim that willing is the only phenomenon that is by definition self-conscious, and that consequently all other self-conscious phenomena are only derivatively so. This lofty claim makes up a mere four pages of the original German text. Not only is the theorem philosophically challenging in itself, but it also forms the foundation for the arguments that follow it which philosophers have found more enticing: the arguments for the necessity of a community of other minds for individuals to emerge, the necessity of political rights for a community of other minds, and for the body for political rights. We cannot understand how Fichte derives these results, without understanding how he derives the first theorem. It might be surprising, then that the argument has attracted only two reconstructions in the English-language literature, from Neuhouser and McNulty. Both reconstructions, I shall argue, fundamentally misconstrue the argument, leaving us with both an implausible account of where Fichte begins his second theorem, and of how he got there.

On the view I defend, Fichte's argument has the following form. Fichte begins by first defining finite self-consciousness in general, then eliminating candidates for what sort of behaviour could instantiate this definition.[2] Any interpretation must therefore give an account of what this definition is, what the possible candidates are, and why the candidates do or do not satisfy the definition. In the first section, I argue that for Fichte finite self-conscious activity must be *limited*, in that its representations are beholden to the world for their success, and *self-reverting*, in that the entity in the world that makes those representations successful is the I itself. Significantly, these two features must appear *in the phenomenology* of self-consciousness - we are dealing with a quasi-empirical argument for how the finite I must in fact appear in consciousness, not a quasi-Kantian argument for the conditions of consciousness in general. In the second section, I deal with Fichte's negative argument: his argument for what does *not* satisfy the definition established above. Unlike McNulty and Neuhouser, I argue that Fichte does not find acting on an end alone to be sufficient for self-consciousness. As I understand him, Fichte argues that both intuiting and acting on an end are not self-reverting in the requisite sense, though they are limited. This is because they refer to an external object in the world, not myself. I successfully intuit a chair if the chair is before me, but equally I successfully act on the end of crafting a table if there is table before me. Instead, in the third section, I argue that it is only *setting* an end, or forming the concept of an end, which is sufficient for self-consciousness. This is because setting an end is a kind of self-determination that is satisfied by my own action: I have successfully set the end of becoming a carpenter if I in fact act to bring that about, regardless of the success of that action. Insofar as actions that issue from the end I have set are events in the world, the activity is limited,

[2] Even this framing is somewhat partial. It is affirmed by [Neuhouser, 2001] but denied by [McNulty, 2016]. I argue against McNulty's framing in the first section of this paper.

and insofar as that action is mine, the activity is self-reverting. Setting an end is a kind of acting, but an acting not on the world, but upon myself.p. 3, end of the big paragraph: say here in what sense setting an end is an action upon the self. In particular, say why it's different from forming a desire (which Fichte does not want to say is something unique to self-conscious beings). -MK This leaves us with an argument that looks like this:

P1 A finite rational being is a being whose self-consciousness is consciousness of a limited and self-reverting activity

P2 A limited and self-reverting activity is either intuiting, acting, or setting ends

P3 Neither intuiting nor acting are limited and self-reverting activities

P4 Setting ends is a limited and self-reverting activity

C A finite rational being is a being whose self-consciousness is consciousness of the activity of setting ends

With Fichte's arguments for P1, P3, and P4 in hand, and thus the questions of what Fichte means by a finite rational being and what activities he thinks do and do not satisfy its definition answered, in the fourth section I turn to P2. I argue that my reconstruction gives principled reason for Fichte to consider these three activities, but that he ignores a fourth candidate for self-consciousness: consciousness of my body's location, or self-intuition. Given Fichte does later in the text argue that the body is requisite for finite self-consciousness, I reconstruct what this means for Fichte's argument as a whole.

1 A finite rational being

It is best to begin with the very letter of the first theorem: "A finite rational being cannot posit itself without ascribing a free efficacy to itself" [*FNR* 17]. My aim in this section will be to elaborate the first terms of this sentence, to explain what Fichte means in the *FNR* by a finite rational being.[3] As we will see, by "rational being" Fichte understands a being that is self-conscious, and that this self-consciousness in the finite case is characterised by two criteria: a finite rational being must be limited and it must be self-reverting. Understanding Fichte's argument that a finite rational being must ascribe a free efficacy to itself will first involve understanding what these initial terms mean, leaving "free efficacy" for the third section. I then present the reading of the structure of the argument as a whole that flows from this definition of the finite rational being.

[3] A challenge in this section, common to a great deal of the *FNR*, is that Fichte does not do a particularly thorough job of defining his terms. A great deal of what is meant by the terms of the argument is in fact articulated within the argument, rather than prior to it. As such, my definitions here may appear somewhat unwarranted. However, I take it they are the only way to make the argument run, and they will cash out in the exposition that is contained in the later sections of this paper.

In a long and complex passage, Fichte sets forth the structure of the finite rational being in two paragraphs. The first characterises rationality, the second finitude, and these are the assumptions with which Fichte begins.

> *Activity that reverts into itself in general* (I-hood, subjectivity) *is the mark of a rational being.* Positing oneself (reflection upon oneself) is an act of this activity. Let this reflection be called A. *Through the act of such activity, the rational being posits itself.* All reflection is directed at something as its object, B. What kind of something, then, must the object of the requisite reflection, A, be? - The rational being is supposed to posit itself in this reflection, to have itself as an object. But the mark of the rational being is activity that *reverts into itself and determines itself*. Therefore, the final and highest substratum, B, of the rational being's reflection upon itself must also be an activity *that reverts into itself and determines itself*. Otherwise, the rational being would not posit itself as a rational being and would not posit itself at all, which contradicts our presupposition.
>
> The rational being presented here is a *finite* rational being. *But a finite rational being is one that can reflect only upon something limited.* These two concepts are reciprocal concepts; one denotes what the other denotes. Therefore, the activity B that reverts into itself would have to be limited; i.e. outside B, there would also have to be a C posited by the reflecting activity that is not this activity but opposed to it. [*FNR* 17]

In this passage, Fichte determines a specific architecture for finite self-consciousness, consisting of three parts A, B, C. A denotes the very act of being conscious of an I, denoted by B. What Fichte asks is what B must be like, such that A reflecting on B is a process that can be described as self-conscious. That is, what makes B an I? In the first paragraph, Fichte argues that this B must be "self-reverting", and in the second paragraph, Fichte argues that this B must be limited. The general problem of the first theorem will be to find a characterisation of B which fulfils these two conditions. These conditions are on *activities*, which we can read along the lines of mental capacities, which I take it are sources of representations with either a theoretical or practical direction of fit.[4]

The first characteristic of finite self-consciousness is that it is *limited*. The idea here is that the I's representations are determinate, and this determinacy stems from something outside the I, which Fichte calls C, which will be defined as the external world in the "Inference" section that follows the First Theorem. The way to cash this thought out is by appealing to the idea that our representations are *beholden* to the world for their success.[5] For example a belief that p is successful only on account of the world being such that p. That we have such mental states is definitive for Fichte of a limited being. To draw out this distinction,

[4] I take it doing otherwise simply begs the question in favour of the fundamentality of practical rather than theoretical self-consciousness.

[5] Or, in a Kantian register, that the activity is receptive.

consider the distinction between episodic memory and imagination as described in the following passage from Soteriou:

> There's a sense in which one is not free to choose what to recollect, in the way that one is free to choose what to imagine. For example, although I may be free to choose to recollect what I had for lunch yesterday, or, alternatively, what I had for dinner, I cannot choose to recollect my having lobster for dinner yesterday, as opposed to beans on toast, whereas I am quite free to imagine that yesterday I was tucking in to lobster while quaffing the finest champagne, and I can perceptually imagine my doing so. [Soteriou, 2008, 475]

What I take to be significant in this passage is that memory, in contrast to imagination, is *beholden to the world*. I am limited in the memory case, where I am not limited in the imagination case, exactly because the success of the representation stems from the world, something outside of my control.

A representation can be beholden to the world in one of two ways. On a theoretical direction of fit, a cognitive representation is beholden to the world in the sense that it is successful if that representation in fact accords with the world - exactly as described in the case of belief and memory above. On a practical direction of fit, a conative representation is beholden to the world in the sense that it is successful if the world accords with the representation - my desire to do p is satisfied only on accord of its making the world p. So being limited allows for both a theoretical and practical construal of the condition. This leaves us with a general definition of limited:

> **Limited:** A finite rational being is limited if the success of its activity is beholden to the world.[6]

The second characteristic of finite self-consciousness is that it is *self-reverting* (*zurückgehend*). Fichte glosesss this as the fact that the I "has itself as its object" [*FNR* 17] and that "it is determined by itself; it is determined and determining at the same time" [*FNR* 19]. Where being limited concerned the success of a representation, being self-reverting concerns the object of that representation. In the case of something self-reverting, the I represents the I, whereas for something that is "directed at the object", the I represents something other than itself, an object.[7] It has long been noted that some judgments pertaining to the I are distinct from those that concern objects, particularly in the sense they are immune to error from misidentification.[8]p. 6, middle, I found myself wondering where Neuhouser's book on Fichte is in this paper, and found that it's not in the bibliography. But it is important for what you say here. MK Consider the fact that the word "I" in sentences like "I am looking at a Vermeer" cannot fail to refer, whereas the word "Vermeer" may well fail to refer. I could be looking at a forgery, but it cannot be the case that someone else is looking at it. Whether

[6] Note here that no distinction is made between actions and mental actions here. Catching a ball is as much beholden to the world as remembering is.

[7] It should be noted that both "world" in the definition of limited, and "object" in the definition of self-reverting should be taken in an extremely broad sense - Fichte only derives the sensible world in the section that follows the first theorem.

[8] For a summary of the long history of this idea in the 20th century and its relation to classical German philosophy, see [Longuenesse, 2017, 19-26].

or not Fichte holds such a view about I-representations, it is certainly the case that he thinks they take a radically different form from representations concerning other kinds of objects. What is significant that there *are* indeed representations that contain the I:

> All other attempts to deduce the I in self-consciousness have been unsuccessful, because they must always presupposed what they want to deduce [...] After all, how could one assume that an I would emerge through the connection of several representations – none of which contained the I itself – if they were simply combined together? [*FNR* 21].

I think there are two things we should take from this. First, that for Fichte, there is an activity which is irreducibly self-conscious in the sense that in it, the I cannot fail to refer - this is the sense in which it is always presupposed. Secondly, and derivatively, the word I does in fact refer, and it does to to some kind of activity. It should be clear that Fichte's response to the Humean problem of finding the I in consciousness is radically different to Kant's, at least on a standard treatment of transcendental rather than empirical apperception. For Fichte does not think that there is *no* representation that contains the I, but rather that it cannot be built up of other representations. So we are looking for a genuine representation in which the I figures as its object, or which irreducibly refers to the I.[9] This leaves us with a definition of self-reverting in contrast to object-dependent:

> **Self-reverting:** A finite rational being is self-reverting if its activity has as its object the I.

As I understand him, therefore, Fichte is looking for an activity that is self-reverting and limited.[10] That these two features are indeed Fichte's aim is shown in his conclusion that:

> Self-consciousness becomes possible *only* by means of such an activity. For what has been presented here contains nothing other than the characteristics that were shown above to be conditions of self-consciousness: namely, that there is an activity that reverts into itself or an activity that has its ultimate ground in the rational being itself, that this activity is finite and limited, that it is posited as limited (i.e. in opposition and relation to something that limits it) and as occurring simply through the fact that the activity is reflected upon [*FNR* 20]

I have suggested that we should take this to mean that the activity in question is beholden to the world, and that its object is the I. Before turning to Fichte's argument that only setting ends satisfies this definition, I

[9] [Neuhouser, 2001, 48] worries that Fichte's argument fails to prove that the Kantian transcendental apperception could not provide an alternative origin for self-consciousness. That is, Fichte fails to respond to Kant's purely formal use of the phrase "I think". But it should be clear from the above that the scope of Fichte's inquiry simply would not include a concept like transcendental apperception, insofar as it fails to be self-reverting in the sense required. This is because, at least on the view I find most compelling, Kant's "I think" does not refer in the case of transcendental apperception. See [Freitag and Kraus, 2022, 114] for a defence of the idea that the "I" in Kant's "I think" does not refer, and thus would not be self-reverting on my definition. Note too that my definition of self-reverting rules out views like that of [Anscombe, 1975] - there is indeed something that the "I" refers to for Fichte.

[10] It is notable that Fichte does not make *unity* key to his discussion of self-consciousness. In the section that follows, §2 Inference, Fichte seems to claim that unity is an achievement that is downstream of self-reversion.

want to take a moment to show how this view differs from on of the extant interpretations of the chapter. Note that by treating the activity B as the topic of debate, I hold that we are dealing not with the absolute I prior to reflection, but rather the finite I that in fact appears in reflection.[11] Following [Henrich, 1982], McNulty takes the starting point of Fichte's argument to be the I prior to reflection, that then becomes the finite (i.e. limited) I through the argument of the first theorem.[12] On McNulty's view, the two characterisitcs of self-consciousness, being limited and being self-reverting are *de facto* contradictory and need to be dialectically united in a higher principle, because self-reversion is purely free, whereas limitation is purely restricted.[13] Bracketing concerns as to whether "dialectical arguments" are legitimate in general, it is unclear how McNulty wants us to understand the contradiction between self-reversion and finitude, and its resolution. When introducing finitude McNulty laments that

> there must be a difference between the self-awareness with which we began and the particular variety of it that has been introduced at this subsequent stage if the argument is not merely to be redundant. Though the issue is complex, I merely suggest here that the form of 'self-positing' with which we began is un-reflective self-awareness, and that Fichte reserves the term self-consciousness for this later, reflective variety. [McNulty, 2016, 794-795]

But how can such a transition from the un-reflective to the reflective occur? McNulty's Fichte starts his argument with a being which is *completely* determined by something internal or something external, announces a contradiction, then states that this contradiction is resolved if the finite rational being is something *partially* determined by something internal and *partially* determined by something external. But this is not a resolution of a contradiction, it is a shifting of the goalposts. If we were forced hold that an entity is 1) red all over and 2) green all over, it would hardly be a solution to the contradiction to say it was 3) partially red and partially green. Better, then, would be to simply start with the fact that the being in question is *already* both limited and self-reverting, and that this need not be a contradiction.[14] McNulty may worry that such a

[11] My analysis divides sharply between B and A, and the reader may ask to what extent this is really possible given that he states that B occurs simply through the fact it is reflected on. Fichte's own language when he introduces B and A is that "Positing oneself (reflection upon oneself) is an act of this activity. Let this reflection be called A." [*FNR* 17, underline mine], which as a reflexive construction, suggests that in the final analysis, A and B are not to be distinguished. This need not be problematic – if I say that my hand is brushing my hair, I am in doing so brushing myself. I can omit reference to my hands or hair, and this can still be true. Or I can draw attention to these components, dividing up the process of brushing myself into parts. Similarly, I can reflect on myself, and draw attention to the reflection A and what is reflected upon B, even if these form a unity.

[12] For views on which concur with mine, and argue that it is the finite I with which Fichte begins his argument, see [Neuhouser, 2001, 41] and [Kosch, 2021a, 220].

[13] Purely textually, I think there are reasons to reject this view. Later in the text, Fichte implores the reader to realise that "*in opposition* to this subject *there is posited* a limited sphere for the subject's possible free actions, but a sphere that nevertheless belongs exclusively to the subject. (By ascribing this sphere to itself, the subject limits itself, distinguishing itself from the absolute, formal I and thereby becoming a determinate, material I, or a person. One would hope that these two quite clearly distinct concepts, which are contrasted here with sufficient clarity, will no longer be confused with one another" [*FNR* 57]. Similarly, the theorem ends with the claims that "the rational being perceives itself immediately only in willing" [*FNR* 20], that "the practical I would be the I for reflection" [ibid.], and that the activity is posited "as occurring simply through the fact the activity is reflected on" [ibid.]. McNulty I am sure will concur that the "finished product" of the argument is something finite or limited. But note that before the argument proper begins, Fichte has already posited C in the First Theorem, and thus these comments hold right from the start.

[14] This, as I understand it, is essentially Neuhouser's interpretation too. In general he holds that the argument attempts to ask why it is "that it is only in practical self-consciousness that the I can be immediately conscious of itself as both self-determining [or self-reverting] and finite?" [Neuhouser, 2001, 44]. Furthermore, Neuhouser also sets out his reconstruction in the candidate elimination

move renders Fichte's argument "redundant" but this is not so: we gain the important insight that a limited and self-reverting activity must be setting ends. Thus I take it would make more sense to simply begin with the finite spontaneity, such that Fichte's text constitutes an argument from premises to conclusion. I turn to the next step of Fichte's argument, the rejection of intuiting and acting on ends as candidates for B now.p. 8, end of section 1, I found myself thinking that the discussion of McNulty is at best footnote material, whereas the content of footnote 14 belongs in the main text. Since McNulty is Neuhouser's student, if they agree here, the relation of dependence can go only in one direction. Neuhouser is the more important person to position yourself with respect to. -MK

2 Neither seeing nor doing

The next step of Fichte's argument rejects that *intuiting* and *acting* are alone self-conscious. Whilst both are *limited* in the proper sense that they are beholden to the world, they are not *self-reverting* in that their objects are not the I.

Fichte's first candidate is intuiting the world. The motivation for this fact is that intuiting is limited, and thus satisfies the first criteria. Intuiting is beholden to the world in exactly the sense that I am successful in intuiting only if the world in fact matches up to the representation. As Fichte puts it, "we must represent the objects as we take them to be apart from any contribution from us; our representation must conform to their being (FNR 18-19). In this, Fichte also reveals why intuiting is not self-reverting, by appeal to a key feature of the phenomenology of perception, its *transparency*, which states that when we reflect on experience, we take the perceptual state to represent the external world perceptual state without any contribution from us. Consider the following classic example:

> When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her experiences [...] Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience. I predict that you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree [Harman, 1990, 39]

In this passage, Harman illustrates that when we perceive a scene, we do not see anything that is characteristically mental. Indeed, the character of our experience just is what the tree and its surroundings are

form: "The basic structure of Fichte's argument in §1 can be articulated as a series of four moves: 1) The task of reconciling the subject's finitude with its nature as self-positing (constituted only by its own activity) provides a set of criteria for what will count as a successful deduction, namely: a form of subjectivity must be found in which the I's consciousness of itself unites an awareness of its limited (begrenzt), other-related character (as finite) with an awareness of itself as self-constituting. 2) The self-consciousness involved in a subject's theoretical stance to the world does not satisfy these criteria. 3) Practical self-consciousness (ascribing a free efficacy to oneself) does meet the stated criteria. 4) Therefore, practical self-consciousness is a necessary condition of self-consciousness for a finite subject." [ibid.]. In the below, I depart from Neuhouser in that I argue that he elides acting on and end with setting an end.

like. What is presented just is the object of experience, nothing more and nothing less. The transparency of perception, or in Fichte's terminology intuiting, is significant for Fichte for two reasons. First, it illustrates the limited character of intuiting. For it is the scene before me, anything about me, which gives the intuiting its character.[15] In other words, the scene acts as that C which restricts B to a determinate character. Second, it illustrates the fact that intuiting is not self-reverting. For in intuiting, the only thing that my thought is directed towards is the object of intuition itself. The I simply does not appear as one intuits the world, it is not the object of the representation. As Fichte puts it, "this world-intuiting activity, by its very concept, is not supposed to revert into the intuiter; it is not supposed to have the intuiter as its object, but rather something outside and opposed to the intuiter; namely, a world" [*FNR* 18].

Fichte's argument therefore is that because intuiting is transparent, because its phenomenology reveals only the object of perception, an I which simply intuits is not what we are conscious of in self-consciousness. This is because there is nothing self-reverting, and therefore nothing that appears as an I, in intuiting. But perhaps this is too fast: for in intuiting there is not only the object intuited, by the I that intuits it. Couldn't we simply attend to this I which intuits? In lectures from the same period as the *FNR*, Fichte seems to make exactly this argument, though concerning thinking rather than intuiting:

> Think of any object at all-the wall, for example, or the stove. The thinking subject is a rational being; but, in thinking of this object, this freely thinking subject forgets about itself and pays no attention to its own free activity. But this is just what one has to do if one wishes to lift oneself to the viewpoint of philosophy. In thinking about an object, one disappears into the object; one thinks about the object, but one does not think about oneself as the subject who is doing this thinking. For example, when I am thinking about the wall I am the thinking subject and the wall is the object of thought. I am not the wall, nor is the wall I. The thinking subject and the object of thought are thus distinguished from one another. But now I am supposed to think about the I. [...] When I think about the wall my activity is directed at something outside of myself, but when I think about the I my activity is self-reverting; i.e., it is directed back upon the I. [*WLnm* 29].[16]

This would seem to suggest that we can turn away from the particular content of the objects of thinking or intuiting, and simply attend to the I which is engaged in that process. This would, presumably, give us an I which is not by its very nature practical, or a free efficacy, but is instead the I of theoretical thinking or intuiting. Furthermore, the activity would be self-reverting: I would have myself as the object of my thought. But Fichte in this text rejects that we would find the I which intuits or thinks in engaging this process, writing "When I do this, as when I think of anything at all, I am an active subject" [ibid.]. But what

[15] Or at least, this is how it appears to introspection. I do not mean to attribute a direct realist theory of perception to Fichte.

[16] That this passage concerns thinking rather than intuiting need not concern us here (Fichte thinks the two are continuous); what is significant is that neither of these are practical activities.

is this? Why can we not reflect on the I which intuits or thinks of an object? p. 10, paragraph at the top, 'why can we not reflect on the I which intuits or thinks an object?' Of course Fichte's view is that we can do this! His claim in the section is the much more modest one that we do not do so 'immediately', where (I take it) that means we do it only as a result of engagement in some practical activity (a very specific one, as we later learn). MK

As it stands then, Fichte seems to ignore a plausible way of reflecting on the self. We could simply begin by intuiting an outer object, and attend to what is doing that intuiting. I take it here Fichte simply denies that there is anything really there which we can grasp. Consider again Fichte's claim that

> All other attempts to deduce the I in self-consciousness have been unsuccessful, because they must always presupposed what they want to deduce [...] After all, how could one assume that an I would emerge through the connection of several representations – none of which contained the I itself – if they were simply combined together? [FNR 21]

p. 10, 'Fichte simply denies that there is anything really there which we can grasp' — this does not look to be what the passage says, and is also contradicted by the passage you produce in the next paragraph, from p. 18. Maybe I'm missing something about the dialectic here? MK Fichte's idea here is that we have *added* the thought of an I that intuits, but really all that is in the content of the state of intuiting is the object. Fichte is happy to endorse that a condition of this intuiting may well be the I, but he denies this is in the content. In a long parenthetical in his discussion of intuition he writes:

> In fact, from the point of view of transcendental philosophy, one even realizes that the intuiting is itself nothing more than an I that reverts into itself and that the world is nothing more than the I intuited within its original limits. But, in order to be capable of ascribing something to itself, the I must already exist for itself; this is simply the question of how the I can exist originally for itself, and this cannot be explained out of the intuiting of the world; rather, intuiting the world becomes possible only by virtue of the I's existing for itself, which is what we are seeking [*FNR* 18]

So even if in the final analysis intuiting involves an I which intuits, this is not given by intuition alone. The self-reverting activity is still yet to be found, because intuiting does not by itself have the I as its object.

As I introduced above, an activity can be limited, or beholden to the world in two ways, one theoretical, and one practical. Having dealt with the theoretical case, Fichte now turns to the practical one. Rather than an activity which is constrained by objects given to it, in the theoretical sense that the representations of the activity are successful when they mirror the objects, Fichte considers an activity which is free with regard to those same objects. As I understand him, this means that the activity is dependent on those objects for its success in the practical sense: it is successful if one's representation alters those objects to bring about

an end. As Fichte puts it, “free activity aims at nullifying the objects insofar as they bind it. Therefore, it is an efficacy directed at objects, and intuition is an efficacy that has been nullified, one that has been freely surrendered by the rational being itself” [*FNR* 19]. This activity is indeed limited, insofar as it is dependent on the world needs to be a certain way (i.e. "nullifed" or altered) for the activity to be successful. But significantly, Fichte again thinks such an activity is not self-reverting:

> this activity, B, necessarily is supposed to be the rational being’s reversion into itself, and insofar as it is directed at objects, it is not such a reversion [. . .] Insofar as this activity is directed as the object, it is determined with respect to its content. But this is not how the activity, originally and in accordance with its essence is supposed to be” [*FNR* 19]

Fichte again thinks this fact about acting on an object on the basis of an end, or willing, is manifest in the phenomenology. When one acts to achieve some end that has already been set, one’s focus is set not on oneself, but rather on the state of affairs in the world to be achieved. p. 11, mid-page, that in willing one’s focus is not on oneself. This seems in tension with the summary in the corollaries that the rational being perceives itself immediately only in willing. MK So if I have the end of picking the lock, my focus is set on the open door.[17] As Fichte himself puts it:

> a rational cause, just as certainly as it is one, constructs for itself the concept of a product that is to be realized through its activity. In acting, it directs itself in accordance with this concept and always, as it were, keeps it in view. This is called the concept of an end [*FNR* 37]

So once again, the phenomenology of the activity of acting on an end is insufficient for the definition of a self-reverting activity. Just as in intuition, the object of the action is simply a state of affairs in the world, rather than anything about me. This is a somewhat surprising result - we might have assumed from Fichte’s pronouncements that it would be exactly intentional action that provides the key argument for the primacy of the practical. But this is not so - acting *on an end* is just as object-directed as intuiting is. Thus it cannot be the activity that we are conscious of in self-consciousness, which I will argue is *setting* an end.[18] Both McNulty and Neuhouser stop their arguments exactly at the point that action is introduced, and interpret this as co-extensive with what I take to be a distinctive activity, that of forming concepts of ends or setting ends. p. 11, bottom of the page. At this point I’m starting to suspect that this effort to articulate a distinct view from the McNulty/Neuhouser one is not going to pan out. You set this up as a disagreement with them, but they don’t deny that end-setting is necessary for self-consciousness. MK For example, Neuhouser writes:

[17] There is a worry that such a picture is too demanding. When I act on the end of going to Chicago, I do not need to literally visualise myself in Chicago throughout the entire process, or at all. So it appears that the representation does not figure in the phenomenology in acting in quite the same way it does in intuiting. One idea would be that this is a standing capacity, rather than an occurrent one. This would fit neatly with Fichte’s idea that we fail to act on an end when that end is obscure to us, or whan we do not reflect on it - see [*SE* 192]. No matter how we characterise the phenomenology of acting, all that matters for Fichte’s argument is that the I should not directly figure in that phenomenology.

[18] Again, there is no doubt that Fichte does think that acting is in some derivative sense self-conscious, just as intuiting is. The point is it is not distinctively so.

> These points are essential for clarifying how the I's setting of ends for itself satisfied the requirements of being self-positing activity, or activity that returns into itself. [...] the setting of ends qualifies as activity that returns into itself only because there is a sense in which the subject's object-directed activity is at the same time a positing of itself. The sense in which the subject posits itself in its practical activity is not difficult to grasp: Because the practical subject determines not just that it sets an end for itself but also the content of that end, it takes itself to be not merely passive with respect to how the empirical world is constituted but (potentially, at least) an active source of the world's determinations. In aiming to act upon the world in accord with its own ends, the practical subject aspires, as it were, to inscribe itself into its object, thereby making its relating to object a form of self-assertion [Neuhouser, 2001, 47]

It is unclear to me why exactly it is that being an active source of the world's determinations in any way implies that an activity is self-reverting. Presumably, plants are active sources of the world's determinations, but there is no sense in which they are self-reverting - they plainly lack a will.[19] Put another way, there is a clear difference between our legislative and executive capacities, which Neuhouser obscures. The burden here is on Neuhouser to explain why it is that the I figures at all in the activity of *acting on an end* as it does in *setting an end*. I will now turn to distinguishing *setting* an end from *acting* on an end.p. 12, final paragraph of section 2. The claim here needs to be clarified. Also to the footnote here, footnote 19: Fichte does in fact think organisms, including plants, act on themselves (are self-reverting, indeed self-determining). What he denies is that they are intellects — that's why they don't have self-consciousness. This strikes me as a problem again at the end of section 3 on p. 14.MK

3 Setting an end

This leaves the final step of Fichte's argument: giving us an activity that is both self-reverting and limited. This activity is *forming concepts of ends*, or *setting ends*, or *forming intentions*. In the previous section, we saw that acting on an object was not sufficient for self-consciousness, because it is not self-reverting. As Fichte puts it, "insofar as it is directed at object, it is not such a reversion. Thus, considered in relation to the rational being itself, this activity must be a free self-determination to exercise efficacy" [*FNR* 19]. In this, we see the first sketch of what Fichte's alternative is. Rather than a "free activity" directed at objects, we instead have something a step removed from this. We have the self-determination to direct our actions at objects in the first place. That is, rather than an efficacy directed at the world, we have an efficacy directed at ourselves. Fichte also expresses this as "the act of forming the concept of an intended efficacy outside

[19] Fichte widely draws a distinction between the distinctive way humans bring about change in the world, and the way non-rational beings do. See for example his discussion of longing in [*SE* 125]. Note that such a distinction maintains that even non-rational organisms are in some sense end-directed and self-determining, though not in the strict sense required for an activity to be self-reverting - see [Kosch, 2021b, 265].

us, or the concept of an end" [ibid.]. The phrasing here is subtle: we are not forming ends in the sense of acting to achieve some end, but are instead forming concepts of ends, representations of states of affairs to be achieved. That is to say, the emphasis is on forming ends, on how we are to have ends that we act on in the first place.

Forming concepts of ends, if it is to be Fichte's solution to the puzzle, must be both limited and self-reverting. If an activity is limited, that means it is beholden to the world for its success. p. 12, second sentence of the same paragraph. This cannot be adequate as a general definition of what it is for an activity to be limited. Is this how it's intended? What does this mean in the case of setting ends? One might think that setting ends, like imagining, is something completely unlimited - we can set any end that we so desire, and there are no conditions of the success of this activity. But there plainly is a difference between an end and a merely imagined scenario: an end ought to be a kind of motivation for the subject that sets that end. That is to say, the end is successfully set if it brings about an action by the subject for the purposes of that end. So there is a peculiar sense in which setting ends does indeed have a success condition, when the end is a motivation for the subject. What is significant here is that this success is in fact an event in the world - my action in the world is an attestation to the end which motivates me. If this is right, then forming concepts of ends is limited in exactly the right sense. For forming ends is beholden to the world in the sense that my action must be present in the world for the activity to be successful. For example, I am successful in setting the end of maintaining dental beauty by brushing and flossing my teeth regularly - the end has motivated me to action. It need not be the case that the action itself is successful in bringing about the completion of that end - if I receive a nasty blow and several of my teeth are cracked during this process, I have no more or less successfully set the end of maintaining dental beauty. Here setting an end is distinguished from acting on it, though the latter is a consequence of the former.p. 13, middle of the same paragraph, I see what looks like a confusion. Is the limitation supposed to come from the fact that I must be motivated to pursue the end I set (and I might not be so motivated)? Or is it supposed to come from the fact that I must succeed in performing some action that is (intuitively) a means to the end I set (and I might not succeed in performing any such action)? I think you may be assuming these are the same or at least coextensive, but they clearly are not. (Consider my setting the end to move a finger which has (without my knowledge) been anesthetized. Or the case where I am so deeply confused about how to bring about a particular end that nothing I would think to do could (intuitively) count as a means to that end?) Because it is my activity that brings about this action in the world, it must be the case that we are dealing with a practical direction of fit, not a theoretical one.pp. 12-13, second paragraph of section 3. I find myself wondering what the textual basis is for what is said in this paragraph.MK

If this distinction is right, we can begin to see why it is that setting an end, rather than acting on an end (or indeed intuiting) is self-reverting as well as limited. I have argued above that acting and intuiting fail

to be self-reverting in the relevant sense in that they do not refer to the I, but rather to external objects. This manifests in the phenomenology, insofar as in both, it is not the I that appears in the content of the representation, but rather an object outside of me. Significantly, this is not so for setting an end. For an end's content is *my* action. Setting an end is irreducibly setting an end for myself, a kind of motivation that involves acting upon myself to resolve to act on the end selected. I do not, and cannot, set ends for other people, or the natural world. The content of an end is fundamentally something *I* do, and which nobody else can do.[20]

There are two loose ends remaining, one terminological, one philosophical. First, Fichte's thesis concerns "ascribing a free efficacy to itself", whereas his argument ends in the "activity [which] is the *act of forming* the concept of an intended efficacy outside us, or the concept of an *end*" [*FNR* 19]. We also see a further definition, the activity as "a free self-determination to exercise efficacy" [ibid.]. By free efficacy, Fichte simply means an activity with a practical direction of fit, in which a representation causes the world to be a certain way. In this way, the activity described above which was not the basis of self-consciousness is still a kind of free efficacy. However, what Fichte is crucially looking for is a free efficacy that is *ascribed to the I*, or which the I determines itself to exercise, or which the I itself forms. So it is these components of the definitions that are key to the proof of the thesis, the reflexive character of self-ascription, self-determination, and end-setting.

Second, Fichte at the end of the deduction claims that intuiting and acting on an end are philosophically derivative on setting ends. My interpretation has not yet explained why this is so. Fichte's position seems to be that we can see intuiting and acting as two outcomes from setting an end. Consider:

> Furthermore, the free activity is supposed to be limited by the world-intuiting activity, i.e. the world-intuiting activity is itself that free activity in the state of being bound; and conversely, the free activity is the activity involved in intuiting the world when the character of being bound falls away: the objects are objects solely because, and insofar as, they are not supposed to exist by virtue of the I's free activity; and this free activity must be curbed or held in check and limited, if the objects are to exist. But free activity aims at nullifying the objects, insofar as they bind it. Therefore, it is an efficacy directed at objects, and intuition is an efficacy that has been nullified, one that has been freely surrendered by the rational being itself. [*FNR* 19]

> At the same time, the activity [forming concepts of ends] is to be *related* to - i.e. posited as identical to - the intuiting; then the activity is an efficacy directed at objects, but (and this is a point not to be overlooked) it is an efficacy that follows immediately from the concept of an end, and is the same as the intuiting, only viewed from a different perspective [*FNR) 19-20*]

[20] To be precise here, I cannot set ends for others in the same way I set ends for myself. I can certainly order or invite someone to act on my end, but the forming of that end is fundamentally my own.

A jigsaw puzzle stands before me, mixed in its box. If I intuit this, I leave everything as it is. I simply take in what is before me. However, this is only so if I freely decide not to act, to put together the puzzle. So every setting of an end is a choosing whether or not to act or intuit, to resolve to be efficacious or not in the world. Both must be understood first from our capacity to set ends, which makes either acting or intuiting possible. p. 14, jigsaw puzzle. I wondered what you mean here. Is it meant as an explication of the quotation from FNR 19? Also, since we're talking about empirical (self-)consciousness, why think Fichte thinks I choose whether to intuit or not? The empirical I is constrained in intuition.MK

What I have drawn out here is that for Fichte, practical activity comes in at least two kinds: acting on an end, and setting an end. What is important for Fichte's argument in the first theorem, is that the former is strictly dependent on the latter. This is because acting on an end is a way of determining an object, and thus is not self-reverting. On the other hand, setting an end is a kind of determining of myself, and thus is properly self-reverting in the required sense. By identifying this capacity for self-determination, we have found the activity that we set out for, and have discovered what makes self-consciousness possible.

4 Free efficacy and the body

In the above I have given a reconstruction of an argument with the following form:

P1 A finite rational being is a being whose self-consciousness is consciousness of a limited and self-reverting activity

P2 A limited and self-reverting activity is either intuiting, acting, or setting ends

P3 Neither intuiting nor acting are limited and self-reverting activities

P4 Setting ends is a limited and self-reverting activity

C A finite rational being is a being whose self-consciousness is consciousness of the activity of setting ends

In the first section, I articulated what Fichte means by P1, in the second section, I drew out his argument for P3, and in the third section I drew out his argument for P4. In this section, I want to discuss P2, and where Fichte's argument places him in terms of contemporary views about self-consciousness. The fate of Fichte's argument is in an important sense dependent on this disjunction. But it's not remotely obvious why these would be the exclusive three candidates for self-conscious activities. As Neuhouser worries "Even if Fichte has shown that practical self-consciousness provides what is required for a subject to be conscious of itself as both finite and self-constitution [P4], his claim that it is *necessary* for such a self-consciousness presupposes that the theoretical and practical forms of consciousness considered in [P2] are exhaustive of

the options" [Neuhouser, 2001, 48].[21] My reconstruction of the argument makes this disjunction clear, insofar as it draws out the two ways in which an activity can be limited. Consider the following matrix:

	Self-Reverting	*World-Directed*
Theoretical (World causes Representation)	???	**Intuiting**
Practical (Representation causes World)	**Setting an End**	**Acting on an End**

Understood like this, we have a good sense of why Fichte chooses the options he does: he is giving the possible ways in which an activity can be limited (either theoretically or practically) against the question of whether an activity is self-reverting. But there is a notable absence here: an activity that has a theoretical direction of fit, i.e. the world causes its success, but which is self-reverting, i.e. the object of that activity is the I. If there is such an activity, then Fichte's needs to explain why it is unsatisfactory for grounding self-consciousness.

One candidate that might fit this description comes from the tradition that following [Evans, 1982] holds that our capacity for I-thoughts is based fundamentally on an indexical use of the I which refers to the body's location. The idea here is to note that both statements about one's own body and I statements share the same property of immunity to error through misidentification, and then say that this is because the statements are fundamentally of the same kind.[22] That is to say, the sense in which I know immediately by bodily awareness that "my legs are bent" is the same way that I know that "I am looking at the Vermeer". If this is right, it seems like we have a candidate in bodily awareness for an activity by which we become self-conscious. Bodily awareness is limited in the theoretical sense, in the sense that it is dependent on one's body, an object in the world, being thus and so.[23] Further, bodily awareness is self-reverting insofar as what it refers to is exactly me. So it seems like we have an option on the table which Fichte has missed.

The first thing to note is that Fichte himself does indeed think that the body is a condition of self-consciousness. The Fourth Theorem of the text argues exactly that "[t]he rational being cannot posit itself as an individual that has efficacy without ascribing to itself, and thereby determining, a material body" (*FNR* 56). The question then is, why this argument didn't appear at the start of the text, and as an alternative to setting ends. This would mean that a kind of theoretical activity, bodily observation, was the real basis of self-consciousness, and we would not need to discuss practical reason at all. The second thing to note is that

[21] My sense is that Neuhouser has in mind particularly *thinking* as a missing candidate. I very briefly want to suggest that Fichte does not consider thinking because he takes it to be continuous with intuiting. This thought is clearer in the *SE* where Fichte writes that "The intuiting subject (the intellect), which becomes an intellect precisely by means of the postulated act, posits the tendency to absolute activity described above, in accordance with the postulate, as – *itself*: that is, as identical with *itself, the intellect* [...] All intuition is, as such, supposed to be directed toward something that is there independently of it, and that is there just as it is intuited to be. [...] In cases where what is intuited is supposed to lie outside the being of the intuiting subject, however, the intellect as such remains a passive onlooker. [*SE* 32]. The idea is that the theoretical intellect, like intuition, is fundamentally dependent on the object it is directed towards.

[22] There are obvious problems with such an approach as stated. For example, why simply assume that the same thing is referred to in both kinds of I statement. See [Brewer, 1995, 295] for this objection and how the Evansian can respond to it.

[23] See Evan's remark that "our thoughts about ourselves are about *objects* - elements of reality" [Evans, 1982, 256]. But they are not object-directed in the sense that they concern a particular object, the I, and therefore have a distinctive referential structure, i.e. that "self-conscious thoughts about ourselves are irreducible to any other mode of thought; in particular, they cannot be regarded as involving the identification of an object by any description. Self-conscious thought about oneself is thought informed, or at least liable to be informed, by information which the subject has (or can normally acquire) about himself" [Evans, 1982, 255].

we have seen the kind of move the Fichtean should make here already. For the Fichtean can well accept that a plurality of acts are derivatively self-conscious, as we saw with intuition and action. In those cases, Fichte argued that we have to *add* the representation of the I. Here, the Fichtean move should be to deny that without setting ends, we would be able to think of a body as "mine" in the first place. That is to say, our capacity for bodily self-awareness must for the Fichtean *follow from* our capacity to set ends. Fichte must assert that I am aware of my body only because I am aware of my ability to set ends for that body. This, I think, is not an implausible view - surely it is exactly because my body stands under my will, where other bodies do not, that my access to it is guaranteed in the sense Evans wants. Our capacity to identify our body is plausibly first and foremost knowledge of what we do, and what we can do.

This move to argue that the body is only my body insofar as I have a practical power for self-determination in accordance with ends would not be post-hoc - there are good independent reasons for adopting it. As described, Fichte's position is that very similar to that defended by [Brewer, 1992].[24] Brewer argues "that the only adequate discrimination of the self as an element of the empirical world is anchored in one's interaction with the perceived environment. Perceptual experience alone is powerless to place its subject with respect to its objects" [Brewer, 1992, 26]. Whilst Brewer claims that this idea "is very much Schopenhauer's" [ibid.], I think we are in a position to see that it is also Fichte's. But Fichte's argument allows us to see a distinction Brewer does not himself make. Brewer throughout mentions both 1)the special status of his body as the immediate respondent to his will" [ibid.] and 2) "the interrelations between his perceptual experience and his purposive interaction with the perceived environment." [Brewer, 1992, 27]. But on Fichte's account, that the body is responsive to our intentions is downstream of our capacity to form those intentions in the first place. Put another way, Brewer leaves unmentioned what it is in the first place to have a will, or to have purposes. So like Neuhouser, Brewer's picture ends up in the right place - that forming concepts of ends is the ground of self-consciousness - but does so in such a way that it does not distinguish two *prima facie* different activities: forming those ends, and acting on those ends.p. 17, paragraph that ends on top of the page. I still don't see what's insufficient, and why focusing on end-setting separately from acting generally helps. MK

In summary, Fichte's view of self-consciousness in the First Theorem is strikingly similar to that offered by Brewer in two respects. First, in that it is able to disengage an objection from an Evansian that we are able to become conscious of ourselves purely by reporting on our bodily sensations. Second, in that the way it does this is by arguing that the way we identify our bodily sensations as our own is by understanding our body as that entity that is receptive to the ends which we set. What is important to Fichte, is that the body only has the significance it has because we are first and foremost able to form concepts of ends, which are then able to immediately determine the body. Fichte does not forget the body; rather he puts it in its

[24] Of course this view is not only Brewer's. See too [Martin, 1995], [Schellenberg, 2007], amongst others.

correct place.

Conclusion

We are now able to understand Fichte's thesis that *a final rational being cannot posit itself without ascribing a free efficacy to itself*. Fichte means that the I would not appear in consciousness if it was not an I which set ends. Setting ends is therefore strictly speaking the only purely self-conscious activity, insofar as it is the only activity in which an I *must* appear to consciousness. I began by asking why there was a difference in self-consciousness between "*I* am writing the letter" or "*I* am seeing the letter before me". We can now complete our list: "*I* intend to write the letter". And this judgment is uniquely self-conscious because in thinking it, in forming the end of writing the letter, I must appear to myself as the agent and patient of the intention – I set the intention for myself, where I do not see the letter "for myself", I simply see it.

I see this reconstruction as progress in the following senses. First, my interpretation allows us to see what is distinctive for Fichte about free efficacy that stems from our own setting of ends, and action upon a given end. Previous interpretations simply muddle these two distinct activities, leaving us in an awkward position to understand Fichte's argument in the second theorem, which concerns how it is we are able to become conscious of our activity of setting ends. Second, my interpretation, unlike those before it, puts Fichte's argument into simply premise-conclusion form. This leaves us in a better position to see where exactly Fichte differs from both his successors and predecessors; I have began that process here. Third, I have provided definitions of of the puzzling Fichtean notions of a "limited" and "self-reverting" activity, terms that appear across the Fichtean corpus. Fichte's First Theorem of Natural Right is now understood; the rest await.

References

[Anscombe, 1975] Anscombe, G. E. M. (1975). The First Person. In Guttenplan, S. D., editor, *Mind and language*, pages 45–65. Clarendon Press.

[Brewer, 1992] Brewer, B. (1992). Self-Location and Agency. *Mind*, 101(401):17–34. Publisher: [Oxford University Press, Mind Association].

[Brewer, 1995] Brewer, B. (1995). Bodily Awareness and the Self. In Bermúdez, J. L., Marcel, A., and Eilan, N., editors, *The Body and the Self*, pages 291–303. MIT Press.

[Evans, 1982] Evans, G. (1982). *The Varieties of Reference*. Clarendon Press. Google-Books-ID: NVwf4ddF3jgC.

[Fichte, 1998] Fichte, J. G. (1998). *Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) Nova Methodo (1796/99)*. Cornell University Press. Google-Books-ID: Ode6O_b64lEC.

[Fichte, 2000] Fichte, J. G. (2000). *Foundations of Natural Right*. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York.

[Fichte, 2005] Fichte, J. G. (2005). *The System of Ethics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

[Freitag and Kraus, 2022] Freitag, W. and Kraus, K. (2022). An expressivist interpretation of Kant's "I think". *Noûs*, 56(1):110–132. _eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/nous.12350.

[Harman, 1990] Harman, G. (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 4:31–52. Publisher: [Ridgeview Publishing Company, Wiley].

[Henrich, 1982] Henrich, D. (1982). Fichte's Original Insight. *Contemporary German Philosophy*, 1:15–55.

[Kosch, 2021a] Kosch, M. (2021a). Fichte on Summons and Self-Consciousness. *Mind*, 130(517):215–249.

[Kosch, 2021b] Kosch, M. (2021b). Fichte's Theory of Drives. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 59(2):247–269. Publisher: Johns Hopkins University Press.

[Longuenesse, 2017] Longuenesse, B. (2017). *I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant, and Back Again*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York.

[Martin, 1995] Martin, M. G. F. (1995). Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership. In Bermúdez, J. L., Marcel, A., and Eilan, N., editors, *The Body and the Self*, pages 267–289. MIT Press.

[McNulty, 2016] McNulty, J. (2016). Transcendental Philosophy and Intersubjectivity: Mutual Recognition as a Condition for the Possibility of Self-Consciousness in Sections 1–3 of Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right. *European Journal of Philosophy*, 24(4):788–810. _eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ejop.12131.

[Neuhouser, 2001] Neuhouser, F. (2001). 3. The Efficacy of the Rational Being (First Proposition: § 1). In Merle, J.-C., editor, *Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Grundlage des Naturrechts*, pages 39–49. Akademie Verlag GmbH.

[Schellenberg, 2007] Schellenberg, S. (2007). Action and Self-Location in Perception. *Mind*, 116(463):603–631. Publisher: [Oxford University Press, Mind Association].

[Soteriou, 2008] Soteriou, M. (2008). The Epistemological Role of Episodic Recollection. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 77(2):472–492. _eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00199.x.